William Whewell raised a series of objections concerning John Stuart Mill's philosophy of science which suggested that Mill's views were properly informed neither by the history of science nor by adequate reflection on scientific practices. These objections, if accurate, would be devastating given Mill's expressed aim of constructing a philosophy of science that was grounded on historical achievements in the sciences and the practices driving these developments. The aim of this paper is to revisit and evaluate this incisive Whewellian criticism of Mill's views. I accomplish this task by assessing Whewell's critique of Mill's use of the discovery of electrical induction as an illustration of the Method of Difference. The historical evidence demonstrates that Mill's reconstruction of this discovery is inadequate for many of the reasons Whewell cites. But a study of Michael Faraday's research leading to this discovery also raises some questions about Whewell's own characterization of this historical episode in the science of electromagnetism. Thus, this example provides an opportunity to reconsider the debate between Whewell and Mill concerning the role of the sciences in the development of an adequate philosophy of scientific methodology.
Introduction
The contentious debates between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill may have concealed a common methodological assumption concerning the role of the sciences in the construction of an adequate philosophy of science.
1 Both Whewell and Mill expressed a desire to build a philosophy of the sciences that was informed by the actual practices and historical achievements of the sciences. Whewell, for instance, discussed the common, and to his mind specious, use of detached examples from various scientific domains in service of a preconceived philosophical framework; he contrasted this approach with his own understanding of scientific knowledge and discovery which was derived from "a connected and systematic survey of the whole range of Physical Science and its History" (Whewell 1847, v. 1, 8 Mill, for his part, articulated a similar methodological goal in the introduction to his analysis of induction in the System of Logic. He declared, What Induction is, therefore, and what conditions render it legitimate, cannot but be deemed the main question of the science of logic-the question which includes all others. It is, however, one which professed writers on logic have almost entirely passed over. The generalities of the subject have not been altogether neglected by metaphysicians; but, for want of sufficient acquaintance with the processes by which science has actually succeeded in establishing general truths, their analysis of the inductive operation, even when unexceptionable as to correctness, has not been specific enough to be made the foundation of practical rules, which might be for induction itself what the rules of the syllogism are for the interpretation of deduction: while those by whom physical science has been carried to its present state of improvement-and who, to arrive at a complete theory of the process, needed only to generalize, and adapt to all varieties of problems, the methods which they themselves employed in their habitual pursuits-never until very lately made any serious attempt to philosophize on the subject, nor regarded the mode in which they arrived at their conclusions as deserving of study, independently of the conclusions themselves. (John Stuart Mill 1963, v. 7, 284 ).
Mill was sincere about developing a philosophy of science that was informed by scientific practice and historical developments in the sciences. In fact, he intentionally delayed writing Book III ('Of Induction') of his System of Logic so that he could foster a deeper acquaintance with the history of science-an achievement he explicitly acknowledged could not have occurred without reading Whewell's History. 2 Mill also revised the manuscript version of the System of Logic so that he could incorporate numerous examples from various scientific domains to illustrate his account of scientific methodology.
3 2 Mill (1963, v.7, cxiii) writes, "Whatever may be the value of what the author has succeeded in effecting on this branch of [induction] , it is a duty to acknowledge that for much of it he has been indebted to several important treatises, partly historical and partly philosophical, on the generalities and processes of physical science, which have been published within the last few years. To these treatises, and to their authors, he has endeavoured to do justice in the body of the work. But as with one of these writers, Dr. Whewell, he has occasion frequently to express differences of opinion, it is more particularly incumbent on him in this place to declare, that without the aid derived from the facts and ideas contained in that gentleman's History of the Inductive Sciences, the corresponding portion of this work would probably not have been written." For further discussion of Mill's use of Whewell's and Herschel's works see John M. Robson's textual introduction to John Stuart Mill (1963, v. 7, lxiii) . 3 Mill borrowed many of these examples from his friend Alexander Bain. Mill (1963, v.1, 255) wrote, "The only person from whom I received any direct assistance in the preparation of the System of Logic was Mr. Bain, since so justly celebrated for his philosophical writings. He went carefully through the manuscript before it was sent to press, and enriched it with a great number of additional examples and illustrations from science; many of which, as well as some detached remarks of his own in confirmation of my logical views, I inserted nearly in his own words." genuine discoveries, or misinterpreted as instances of inductive discovery when, in fact, they were extensions of known laws by deduction. 5 Whewell also maintained that Mill's philosophy of scientific methodology was flawed because it failed to provide guidance concerning the use of scientific methods to those actually engaged in research. In particular, Mill did not offer directives for reducing the complex relations among phenomena to sets of antecedent conditions and consequent phenomena. A reduction of this kind was necessary if these methods were to be useful in establishing laws of physical causation-the ultimate goal of inductive inquiry according to Mill. 4 See Robert Butts 1963, 288-289. 5 Laura J. Snyder (2002 Snyder ( , 2006 Snyder ( , and 2008 argues that Whewell's concern was not simply Mill's failure to infer his methods from historically significant scientific examples but that Mill's methods were not such that they could be inferred from the history of science. In her (2008, she contends that Whewell "showed us in his works-through numerous apt examples-that his philosophy has been embodied in the practice of science throughout its history" but "Mill was unable to do so. Berkson (1974), and Geoffrey Cantor (1991) . 8 For some helpful discussions of Oërsted's discovery see R.C. Stauffer (1953 and 1957) , L. Pearce Williams (1965) , David Gooding (1990), and Roberto De Andrade Martens (2003) . 9 Between Oërsted's discovery and Faraday's discovery many improvements were made to this basic apparatus. In his experiments, Faraday employed a voltaic trough which consisted of two dissimilar metals situated within a trough of fluid. 10 For a thorough discussion of the experiments conducted during this time and the failure to recognize specific results as indicative of electrical induction see Sydney Ross (1965 system. This indicated that electricity could produce magnetic effects without employing magnetic substances and convinced Ampère that all magnetic phenomena could be explained in terms of the activity of electrical currents. In its ultimate form, Ampère's theory posited that magnetic phenomena were the result of electrodynamic currents 11 For an interesting discussion of the effect of Faraday's research on transient phenomena in distinct scientific domains on this discovery see Ryan Tweeney (1985) . 12 For more discussion of Ampère's work see James Hoffman (1987 and .
rotating around the molecules of so-called magnetic substances. Faraday's discovery that voltaic currents, ordinary magnets, and electromagnets produced similar effects strengthened the empirical case for Ampère's reduction of magnetic phenomena to electrical causes. In fact, Faraday (1956, v.1, 16 ) maintained that his experimental results
were "strikingly in accordance with and confirmatory of M. Ampère's theory, and
[furnish] powerful reasons for believing that the action is the same in both cases." Although Faraday confessed that there was no independent evidence grounding the reality of this proposed state, he noted that adopting it as a hypothesis could provide an account of a mechanism by which an identical cause could produce this diverse array of effects. Faraday's reflection could be interpreted as an attempt to extend Ampère's theoretical framework by supplying a hypothesis concerning the manner in which electricity might act as the underlying cause of induced electrical currents in each experimental trial.
But Faraday followed this speculative discussion of the electro-tonic state with an extensive discussion of the laws governing both induced electricity and related electromagnetic phenomena. 13 At the time, many of Faraday's contemporaries thought that these phenomena were completely mysterious. The phenomena in question involved the magnetic effects of substances scientists generally thought were essentially nonmagnetic. In particular, Dominique François Arago had discovered that a rotating copper disc caused a magnet delicately suspended above it to rotate in a corresponding direction.
But copper in its natural resting state exhibited no magnetic qualities. Charles Babbage and John F.W. Herschel discovered the reciprocal effect that rotating magnets caused metallic discs in their immediate vicinity to rotate in a corresponding direction. 14 But when these magnets and metallic discs were at rest, they exhibited no detectable magnetic effects.
Faraday argued that the key to explaining these effects was the transient nature of induced electricity. He showed that the motion of any metal around the pole of a magnet gives rise to electrical currents that move in a transverse direction across the metal. Faraday (1956, v.1, 34) writes, "All these results show that the power of inducing electric currents is circumferentially exerted by a magnetic resultant or axis of power, just as circumferential magnetism is dependent upon and is exhibited by an electric current."
Thus, in Arago's original experiments, the constant rotation of the magnets in a corresponding direction to the rotating discs is explicable in terms of the currents generated by the motion of the rotating discs around the pole of the magnets in the experimental system. Faraday's experimental research established the exact nature of 13 For an extensive discussion of this aspect of Faraday's research see Steinle (1994) . 14 See Charles Babbage and John F.W. Herschel (1825).
induced electrical currents and generated a correct understanding of the laws governing both the phenomena of induced electricity and the magnetic effects of rotating discs.
Mill on the Discovery of Electrical Induction
Mill situated Faraday's discovery of electrical induction within an extended discussion of the "theory of induced electricity" (1963, v.7, 410ff Mill contends that the purpose of Faraday's research was to determine whether a conducting wire carrying a voltaic current would produce an opposite electrical current on another conductor in its vicinity. But Mill maintains that Faraday's research was founded on the assumption that common, or static, electricity is identical with the electricity occasioned by a voltaic apparatus. He writes,
Since common or machine electricity, and voltaic electricity, may be considered for the present purpose to be identical, Faraday wished to know whether, as the prime conductor develops opposite electricity upon a conductor in its vicinity, so a voltaic current running along a wire would induce an opposite current upon another wire laid parallel to it at a short distance. (John Stuart Mill 1963, v.7, 413) The results of Faraday's experiments were different from the other cases Mill discussed in connection with the law of induced electricity in that all the other cases involved an electric body inducing an opposite and continuous electrical state in neighboring bodies. Faraday's results in this experiment, according to Mill, showed that the opposite electrical state was produced within the primary conducting wire itself. Mill observed,
From the nature of a voltaic charge, the two opposite currents necessary to the existence of each other are both accommodated in one wire; and there is no need of another wire placed beside it to contain one of them.... (John Stuart Mill 1963, v.7, 413) Thus, in the case of Faraday's experiments, Mill believed that the "exciting cause can and does produce all the effect which its laws require, independently of any electric excitement of a neighbouring body" (1963, v.7, 413 The primary importance of electromagnetism in this context was that it provided evidence of a connection between distinct kinds of polarities. Oërsted's vague notion of a connection between the polarities exhibited by electricity and magnetism was refined by experiment until they came to be seen as manifestations of one and the same causethe polarity of Ampère's electrodynamic current. Thus, the vague and obscure persuasion that there must be some connexion between electricity and magnetism, so long an idle and barren conjecture, was unfolded into a complete theory, according to which magnetic and electromotive actions are only two different manifestations of the same forces; and all the above-mentioned complex relations of polarities are While the significance of Ampère's electrodynamic theory should not be understated, Faraday's introductory remarks in his "First Series" suggests that confirmation of Ampère's views may not have been paramount in his mind. At the outset of his paper, Faraday states explicitly that it was a "curious fact" that no one had shown that magnets could induce electrical currents. The fact that no one had discovered these effects was curious, Faraday writes, "Whether Ampère's beautiful theory were adopted, or any other, or whatever reservation were mentally made" (Faraday 1956, v.1, 2) . The important point to note here is that the failure to discover the reciprocal effect was Although I did not discuss Faraday's account of the direction of the induced electrical current in his research, this was an important part of his research. In fact, Faraday's initial account of his discovery of electrical induction included in a letter to his friend Richard Phillips contained a significant error concerning the direction of the induced electrical current. Josè Romo and Manuel G. Doncel (1994) argue that Faraday's error stems from his reliance upon expectations derived from Ampère's electrodynamic theory. It was only through subsequent experimental research that Faraday was able to correct his erroneous account of the direction of the induced electrical current. This provides another piece of evidence that Faraday's experimental research is separable from Ampère's views since it was only be conducting his research that Faraday was able to correct the misleading Ampèrian understanding of the effect. about this hypothetical state. Thus, the explanatory claims he made concerning the laws governing induced electrical currents enjoyed a much higher degree of epistemic credibility in Faraday's mind.
Finally, when one attends to the experiments Faraday performed, especially in his research on Arago's rotating discs, one sees that Faraday's primarily goal is to explore the relationship between the systematic adjustment of experimental parameters and the resulting effects within his experimental system. By the time Faraday was working on these questions, he had developed a stable understanding of the basic or simple case, of induced electricity; he knew how to produce it reliably and which sets of antecedent conditions were essential to the production of this effect. 20 His subsequent experimentation explored the relationship between this basic effect and other related phenomena with an eye to understanding the laws governing these phenomena. Even if Ampère's views were essential to the motivations of Faraday's research program, by the time Faraday had achieved an experimental understanding of an induced electrical current as a basic effect, his goal was not to deepen the support for Ampère's theoretical views. His results could be used to corroborate Ampère's views, but Faraday was much more concerned about articulating a precise account of the basic effect, the conditions for its reliable production, and a general account of the laws unifying this phenomenon with other related phenomena.
Faraday was also interested in technological advancements he could produce as a result of his understanding of these effects and their governing laws. His research had indicated that one could produce a continuous flow of electrical currents through the 20 For much more on this aspect of Faraday's work see Steinle (1994 Steinle ( , 1997 Steinle ( , and 2002 .
continuous motion of magnets. This was an important discovery because up until this point, the production of dynamic forms of electricity was inhibited by an apparatus whose power diminished over time. The prospect of producing a continuous flow of electrical currents with an apparatus that would not lose its power was an exciting possibility.
Hence, although Whewell is correct to note the importance of Ampère's work in providing a faithful historical reconstruction of Faraday's work, it is not clear that Mill contends that his sole aim in providing an inductive logic was to provide rules and models…to which if inductive arguments conform, those arguments are conclusive, and not otherwise. This is what the Four Methods profess to be, and what I believe they are universally considered to be by experimental philosophers, who had practised all of them long before any one sought to reduce the practice to theory. (John Stuart Mill, 1963, v. 7, 430) .
His methods, then, should not be taken as methods of discovery; rather, they are formal methods by which one can test whether a discovery satisfies the canons of inductive inquiry. Progress cannot be made in the sciences until one possesses a canon for assessing whether some body of evidence inductively justifies a general explanatory claim. Given that the indicating device was a magnetic needle, Faraday had to insure that the magnets used in these experiments would not cause the deflection directly. He had to prove that the deflections were the result of induced electrical currents not the direct magnetic action of the magnet he employed in his experiments. Faraday observed, All care was taken to guard against any direct action of the inducing magnet upon the galvanometer, and it was found that by moving the magnet in the same direction, and to the same degree on the outside of the helix no effect on the needle was produced. (Faraday 1956, v. 1, 12) Since these magnets did not cause the deflection directly from their motion outside the axis of the helix, the inductive effects could not be attributed to the direct action of the magnets. Thus, Faraday concluded that the deflections were produced by induced electrical currents.
One can reconstruct Faraday's support for this claim in accordance with Mill's method of difference. In the first trial, the initiation of motion of a permanent magnet within the axis of the helices resulted in the deflection of the indicator needle. In the second trial, the initiation of motion of a permanent magnet outside of the axis of the helices did not produce deflections of the galvanometer needle. Since the deflections occurred in the first trial and did not occur in the second trial, one must trace this difference to one of the antecedent conditions. This difference was in the location of the magnet when Faraday initiated motion with the magnet. Given that there was no direct action of the magnet on the galvanometer needle, these experiments supported the general claim that the deflections in the first case were the result of induced electrical currents produced by the motion of the magnet within the axis of the compound helices. The general conclusion one ought to infer from this discussion is that much more work needs to be done in order to articulate the normative role of the history and practices of the sciences in the construction of an adequate philosophy of science. While there are clear cases where a philosophy fails to accord with the history and the practice of the sciences, until there is a precise and well-grounded account of the function of the history and practice of the sciences in the development of a philosophy of science, it is not clear how one can determine whether, and to what extent, a particular philosophy of science is adequately-informed by the sciences.
